Meeting the Challenges of International Terrorism: A Salon Discussion with The Washington Note and UN Dispatch

For the next seven days, UN Dispatch, The Washington Note and On Day One will host an online discussion about international terrorism and offer recommendations for how the next United States president can meet these challenges. Leading this discussion is an international panel of experts on terrorism, counter-terrorism, international law, and national security. We are honored to have Steve Clemons as a moderator and co-host on The Washington Note.

Our panel of experts (full bios here) include:

Peter Bergen, New America Foundation

Paul Cruickshank, NYU Center on Law and Security

Greg Djerejian, The Belgravia Dispatch

Stephanie Kaplan, Woodrow Wilson Center

Matthew Levitt, Washington Institute on Near East Policy

Alastair Millar, Center on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation

Eric Rosand, Center on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation

Yosri Fouda, Al Jazeera

Terrorism and Poverty?  

In preparation for this discussion, we solicited On Day One users for their ideas on how the next president should take on the threat of global terrorism and many people responded by suggesting that if the United States does more to alleviate poverty in the developing world the terrorist threat could be mitigated.

But is terrorism actually linked to poverty? Is it linked to other externalities, like grievances with American foreign policy, perceived humiliation, nationalist political objectives, radical ideology --- or all of the above? Which is most dominant? Which is most underestimated in current approaches to terrorism?

Our experts weigh in:  

Gregory P. Djeredjian
I certainly believe there are links between poverty and terrorism, but particularly in terms of the West's so-called Global War on Terror, I believe more important are other variables such as the ones mentioned in the prompt, e.g. perceived humiliation, grievances w/ U.S. foreign policy, radical ideology etc.

For instance, certain of the key 9/11 hijackers were reasonably middle (or lower-middle class) young adults residing in European cities. And while others on this E-mail chain far more knowledgeable than me might correct me, the 15 or so Saudi hijackers (of the 19 total) I don't recall having had hugely impoverished backgrounds, though certainly they were not enjoying the fruits of the petro-dollar gusher as are their local elites.

Still, I'd think, these terrorists were not the hugely impoverished peasants inhabiting the border-lands of South Waziristan and Afghanistan, say. (Incidentally, to mount "A Team" style sophisticated attacks in the West, almost as a tactical 'gating-item', once must enjoy a modicum of education and 'Westerness' to evade heightened security measures, pointing to those most dangerous potential terrorists not necessarily being those mired in the worst of endemic 3rd world poverty).

Meantime, and putting aside the famous example of Mohammed Atta and Co., one might query too whether the Madrid train bombers (mostly young Moroccans) or the July 7th London attackers (mostly home-grown and by the accounts I'm familiar with not desperately poor either), were primarily driven to action by poverty. I suspect not, but for avoidance of doubt, please note this is not to argue a key part of our overall anti-terror strategy mustn't include economic development initiatives in critical areas like the Maghreb, Pakistan, etc, as doubtless poverty alleviation (not least given the demographic boom through MENA and South Asia of younger citizens) will become an increasingly critical challenge for policy-makers in the coming years/decades. I view poverty therefore as a tremendously unhelpful variable in all of this, but not necessarily a primary cause.

Indeed, I'd argue in this Internet and global cable age where IDF airstrikes in, say, southern Lebanon inflame televised opinion in the Islamic World from Tangier to Jakarta, it is more foreign policy actions of various powers, particularly those stoking feelings of humiliation, that create the impetus for (mostly) young Muslim males to join the jihadi cause. This said, local autocracies frustrating freedom of expression are a major part of this toxic brew as well, of course.

Related, I believe there is a 'hard-core' of ideological true-believers for whom radical ideology--and radical ideology alone--provide the requisite motivational impulse towards terror (say restoration of the much discussed caliphate). But I believe there are a good number of 'fence-sitters', some perhaps even tempted towards the faux romance of terrorism by boredom and feelings of alienation while residing in the West, who end up pursuing violent tactics not as much because of ideology per se necessarily, but 'hot topics' like the foreign policy of the U.S., which in turn lead to occasional feelings of perceived humiliation, leading them towards acts of terrorist horror.

Last, I would say the most underestimated cause (per the question prompt) is very likely the occupation of Islamic lands by foreign powers. This has historically been a major cause of Palestinian terrorism (see, over the years, the PLO, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP etc), and see too Chechnya, Lebanon (Hezbollah notably), and more. This being said, the transnational al-Qaeda variety of terrorism has sought to conflate festering conflicts/occupation/humiliation--and then somewhat fuse same w/ 'purist' ideology--so as to thereby be immunized some to the ebbs and flows of localized disputes, the better so there appear to perennially be 'near' and 'far' enemies, the scope of the jihadist playing field is global, and progress in the Middle East peace process, say (were we ever to see any again), would not be a reason to lay down arms.

Matthew Levitt
Poverty, in and of itself, does not lead to terrorism. But it can be part of the problem, as the case of disenfranchised Muslim communities in Europe make clear. In the words of one European official I recently interviewed on this issue, "poverty is rarely one of the key radicalizers, but unemployment can be, especially when combined with engaging in criminal activity and being exposed to a radical narrative." Radical ideologies are better able to take root when discrimination and the lack of opportunity for economic growth are put in terms of a global narrative that weave personal experiences in the suburbs north of Paris together with the plight of fellow Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine or Iraq to personalize far away conflicts and paint a global, ideological struggle. That global narrative is where foreign policy becomes one part of this larger tapestry as well, especially when presented through a radical ideological lens. To my mind the ideological component is the most critical and overlooked component here.

As several studies have demonstrated, organized radicalization and recruitment (let alone training and the provision of funds and weapons) has long been central to the formation of a terrorist--that is, someone who is not only angry but willing to act on that anger in a violent manner. Today, that organizational function is in some cases carried out more passively via exposure to ideas and, perhaps more critically, a sense of belonging to a group of like-minded followers, on the Internet. But even among the increasing number of "homegrown" terrorists, European officials stress the importance of pre-existing personal vulnerabilities that serve as "push factors"as well as exposure to "radicalizers" - in person or online - over a period of time.

No single psychological profile describes the wide variety of "push factors" that make individuals vulnerable to the kind of radicalization that can eventually lead them to become terrorists. One study, by Tel Aviv University researchers Shaul Kimhe and Shmuel Even, developed a series of prototypical categories that combine both clinical and social psychological causes among Palestinians who resorted to terrorism. A telling corollary to their primary findings, however, is that whatever the typology of the potential terrorist--"religious fanatic," "nationalist fanatic," "avenger," or "exploited"--every type requires "a social environment that is supportive of such an attack; media that disseminates the information among the supportive population; spiritual leadership that encourages such attacks; and financial and social assistance for families of suicide terrorists after their death." Together, these conditions create a "comprehensive social environment [that] may be referred to as the 'culture of suicide terrorists' that has been created within Palestinian society." [See here.]

Social preconditions by themselves do not make a suicide bomber. While poverty, humiliation, occupation, personal suffering, shame, or loss of a loved one can all be powerful radicalizing factors, they almost always require an organized element to channel that anger and frustration -- actively and in person or passively on the Internet -- into a desire to kill and maim random civilians (as opposed, for example, to a desire simply to kill oneself). It is for this reason that groups subscribing to a radical ideology invest so much time, effort and money in media campaigns aimed at radicalizing and directly or indirectly recruiting future members.

Check back throughout this week and next for more commentary on the nexis between terrorism and poverty and other issues raised by on day one users.